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BEYOND BORDERS: CAFTA’S ROLE IN SHAPING LABOR 
STANDARDS IN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 
Lyndsay D. Speece∗
INTRODUCTION 
The world in which we live is becoming more intertwined as 
each day passes—this is evident in aspects as elementary as an indi-
vidual’s choice of clothing for the day: a dress shirt manufactured in 
Singapore, khaki pants made in Morocco, fashionably completed by a 
matching belt and shoe set from the finest leather in Brazil.  As the 
international intermingling of products persists, the disparities be-
tween those wearing the stylish ensemble and those providing the 
outfit become more pronounced.  In recent years, stories of sweat 
shops in South Asia1 and “maquiladora”2 workers in Mexico have 
caught the attention of many and brought to the forefront a concern 
for the sub-standard working conditions of foreign laborers. 
At the same time, the U.S. executive and legislative branches 
have ardently pushed for the expansion of bilateral and multilateral 
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) to bolster the American economy, 
stabilize national security, and promote democracy.3  In this context, 
 ∗ J.D., May 2007, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2003, University of 
Nebraska, Omaha.  The author would like to thank Anita R. Speece for her encour-
agement and support with this comment. 
 1 See BOB HEPPLE, LABOUR LAWS AND GLOBAL TRADE 6 n.13 (2005) (“The term 
‘sweatshop’ was coined in the 19th century in Britain to describe establishments in 
unorganised trades where wages and conditions were considered exploitative . . . .”). 
 2 Maquiladoras, or Export Processing Zones, are defined by the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) as “industrial zones with special incentives set up to at-
tract foreign investors.”  International Labour Organization, Export Processing 
Zones, http://www-ilo-mirror.cornell.edu/public/english/dialogue/sector/themes/ 
epz.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2007).  In the maquilas of Mexico and Central America, 
the special incentives are “low wages, a lack of environmental or labour regulations, 
low taxes, and few if any duties.”  Maquila Solidarity Network, Maquilas: What Is a 
Maquila?, http://www.maquilasolidarity.org/resources/maquilas/whatis.htm (last 
visited Apr. 4, 2007). 
 3 See Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3801(b)(1) (Supp. 
IV 2004). 
The expansion of international trade is vital to the national security of 
the United States.  Trade is critical to the economic growth and 
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the issue of labor conditions in countries viewed as prospective trad-
ing partners is inextricably intertwined with the United States’ de-
mocratically rooted philosophy of promoting free trade.4  As barriers 
to trade are reduced due to the proliferation of FTAs, the attendant 
duties and obligations of trading partners become an issue of key im-
portance. 
In light of the strong efforts to expand international trade and 
reduce tariff barriers to American products, the dawn of the twenty-
first century has produced a new era of FTAs between the United 
States and individual countries,5 as well as collective regions,6 
throughout the world.  August 2, 2005 marked the newest addition to 
the ever-expanding list of FTAs as the U.S.-Dominican Repub-
lic/Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) was entered 
into force and became public law.7
This Comment addresses the United States’ promulgation and 
passage of CAFTA, with particular focus on, and analysis of, the labor 
provisions contained therein.  Part I discusses the history leading up 
to the enactment of CAFTA, including the arguments for and against 
the agreement.8  Part II focuses specifically on the labor provisions 
and capacity building mechanisms contained in Article 16 of CAFTA, 
including criticisms and defense of the provisions.9  Part III provides 
strength of the United States and to its leadership in the world.  Stable 
trading relationships promote security and prosperity.  Trade agree-
ments today serve the same purposes that security pacts played during 
the Cold War, binding nations together through a series of mutual 
rights and obligations.  Leadership by the United States in interna-
tional trade fosters open markets, democracy, and peace throughout 
the world. 
Id. 
 4 See id. § 3802(a)(6)–(7).  The overall trade negotiating objectives of the United 
States include “to promote respect for worker rights and the rights of children con-
sistent with core labor standards . . . and an understanding of the relationship be-
tween trade and worker rights.”  Id. § 3802(a)(6). 
 5 See, e.g., Agreement Between the United States of America and the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, Oct. 24, 
2000, 41 I.L.M. 63 [hereinafter U.S.-Jordan FTA]; United States–Chile Free Trade 
Agreement, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003, 117 Stat. 909 (2003) [hereinafter U.S.-Chile 
FTA]; Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., May 18, 2004, 118 
Stat. 919 (2004). 
 6 See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 8, 1992, 
107 Stat. 2057 (1993). 
 7 Dominican Republic-Central America-U.S. Free Trade Agreement Implemen-
tation Act, Pub. L. No. 109-53, 119 Stat. 462 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 
19 U.S.C.). 
 8 See infra Part I. 
 9 See infra Part II. 
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an analysis of the present day labor conditions with which CAFTA 
must contend.10  Finally, Part IV tracks the progression of American 
FTAs and CAFTA’s place in this succession, and suggests a model of 
success for crafting the labor provisions of future FTAs.11
I. THE ROAD TO CAFTA 
CAFTA, the most recently enacted FTA, encompasses the Cen-
tral American countries of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, and Nicaragua, as well as the Caribbean nation of the Domini-
can Republic.12  CAFTA represents the Bush administration’s 
(“Administration”) focus on promulgating tariff-reducing agreements 
with a multitude of nations.13  The push for establishing FTAs 
throughout the world is supported by the objectives outlined by Con-
gress in the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 (TPA, 
or “fast-track”).14
Prior to CAFTA, all of the countries now party to the agreement 
were beneficiary countries to the Caribbean Basin Economic Recov-
ery Act (CBERA),15 pursuant to presidential designation.16  Under 
CBERA, beneficiary countries enjoyed tariff-free exports to the 
United States for certain articles.17  In determining whether to desig-
nate a nation as a beneficiary country, CBERA outlined various fac-
tors for the president to consider in granting beneficiary status: 
 10 See infra Part III. 
 11 See infra Part IV. 
 12 19 U.S.C.A. § 4001 (West 2005). 
 13 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, STATEMENT ON HOW THE 
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC – CENTRAL AMERICA – UNITED STATES FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
MAKES PROGRESS IN ACHIEVING U.S. PURPOSES, POLICIES, OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES 2 
(2005), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/Transmit 
tal/asset_upload_file122_7816.pdf  (“The Agreement forms an integral part of the 
Administration’s larger strategy of opening markets around the world through nego-
tiating and concluding global, regional, and bilateral trade initiatives.”). 
 14 Congress justifies the promulgation of FTAs on the basis that  
[t]rade agreements maximize opportunities for the critical sectors and 
[are]building blocks of the economy of the United States . . . . Trade 
will create new opportunities for the United States and preserve the 
unparalleled strength of the United States in economic, political, and 
military affairs.  The United States, secured by expanding trade and 
economic opportunities, will meet the challenges of the twenty-first 
century. 
19 U.S.C. § 3801(b)(2) (Supp. IV 2004). 
 15 19 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (2000). 
 16 Id. § 2702(a)(1)(A). 
 17 Id. § 2701. “The President may proclaim duty-free treatment (or other prefer-
ential treatment) for all eligible articles from any beneficiary country in accordance 
with the provisions of this chapter.”  Id. § 2701. 
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1) an expression by such country of its desire to be so desig-
nated; 
2) the economic conditions in such country, the living standards 
of its inhabitants, and any other economic factors which he 
deems appropriate; 
3) the extent to which such country has assured the United 
States it will provide equitable and reasonable access to the 
markets and basic commodity resources of such country; 
4) the degree to which such country follows the accepted rules 
of international trade provided for under the WTO Agree-
ment and the multilateral trade agreements (as such terms 
are defined in paragraphs (9) and (4), respectively, of section 
2 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act [19 U.S.C. § 
3501(9) and (4)]); 
5) the degree to which such country uses export subsidies or 
imposes export performance requirements or local content 
requirements which distort international trade; 
6)     the degree to which the trade policies of such country as 
they relate to other beneficiary countries are contributing to 
the revitalization of the region; 
7) the degree to which such country is undertaking self-help 
measures to promote its own economic development; 
8) whether or not such country has taken or is taking steps to af-
ford to workers in that country (including any designated 
zone in that country) internationally recognized worker 
rights.18 
Expanding upon the criteria laid out in 19 U.S.C. § 2702, § 2703 fur-
ther defines these factors, including an assessment of “the extent to 
which the country provides internationally recognized worker 
rights.”19  These internationally recognized rights include: 
(I) the right of association; 
(II) the right to organize and bargain collectively; 
(III) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or com-
pulsory labor; 
(IV) a minimum age for the employment of children; and 
(V) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum 
wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and 
health.20 
The same above-named factors are also to be considered when de-
termining if a country should be withdrawn or suspended from its 
 18 Id. § 2702(c)(1)–(8). 
 19 Id. § 2703(b)(5)(B)(iii). 
 20 Id. § 2703(b)(5)(B)(iii)(I)–(V). 
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beneficiary status.21  CBERA provides a mechanism for the president 
to proscribe complete or selective sanctions if a beneficiary country is 
not in compliance with the objectives set forth therein.22  CBERA 
therefore, promotes tariff-free imports into the United States, while 
at the same time providing for a unilateral withdrawal mechanism by 
the United States should a country not comply with levels articulated 
by CBERA.23
To many, CBERA represented a one-sided trade preference pro-
gram to Central American countries without duty-free reciprocity for 
United States goods and services, thereby perpetuating an unequal 
playing field between the United States and designated beneficiary 
countries.24  In response to this view, early in 2001, Robert Zoellick, 
former United States Trade Representative, commenced discussions 
 21 See Id. § 2702(f)(1)(B). 
 22 Id. § 2702(e)(1)(A)–(B). 
(1)(A) The President may, after the requirements of subsection (a)(2) of this 
section and paragraph (2) have been met– 
          (i) withdraw or suspend the designation of any country as a bene-
ficiary country, or 
          (ii) withdraw, suspend, or limit the application of duty-free 
treatment under this chapter to any article of any country, if, after such 
designation, the President determines that as a result of changed cir-
cumstances such country would be barred from designation as a bene-
ficiary country under subsection (b) of this section. 
     (B) The President may, after the requirements of subsection (a)(2) 
of this section and paragraph (2) have been met– 
          (i) withdraw or suspend the designation of any country as a [Car-
ibbean Basin Trade Partnership Act] beneficiary country; or 
          (ii) withdraw, suspend, or limit the application of preferential 
treatment under section 2703(b)(2) and (3) of this title to any article 
of any country, if, after such designation, the President determines 
that, as a result of changed circumstances, the performance of such 
country is not satisfactory under the criteria set forth in section 
2703(b)(5)(B) of this title. 
Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 See Implementation of the Dominican Republic–Central America Free Trade Agreement: 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of 
Hon. Peter F. Allgeier, Acting U.S. Trade Rep., Office of the U.S. Trade Rep.), avail-
able at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=view&id=3061 
[hereinafter Allgeier]. 
But while these Central American countries and the Dominican Re-
public buy many goods and services from the United States, we cur-
rently face an unlevel playing field. . . . Under unilateral preference 
programs begun by President Reagan and expanded under President 
Clinton with broad bipartisan support, nearly 80 percent of imports 
from Central America and the Dominican Republic already enter the 
United States duty-free. 
Id. 
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with Central American leaders for the negotiation of a regional FTA 
between the countries and the United States for reciprocity of duty-
free imports and exports.25  Thereafter, on “January 16, 2002, Presi-
dent George W. Bush announced his administration’s objective to 
explore a free trade agreement . . . with the five countries that are 
members of the Central American Common Market.”26
The motivations for the enactment of CAFTA are numerous and 
varied from the United States’ perspective.27  The principal goal of 
CAFTA, however, is that it forms a “part of the broader US strategy of 
‘competitive liberalization’ as well as of supporting democratic devel-
opments in the Western Hemisphere and building economic alli-
ances with countries crucial to US national security.”28   
The United States’ emphasis of building economic alliances 
manifests itself to the utmost degree in the proposed, yet highly de-
bated, Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), which seeks 
to establish an FTA with all of Central and South America, as well as 
Caribbean nations.29  CAFTA represents an alternative approach to 
FTAA.30  Many argue, however, that CAFTA is a “divide and conquer” 
approach because of failed FTAA negotiations due to lack of support 
for the broad agreement from important countries such as Brazil, 
Venezuela, and Uruguay.31  Additionally, it has been argued that this 
strategy “lessens the scope of coalitions negotiating the FTAA and 
puts tremendous stress on the remaining countries to get in line after 
. . . Central America.”32
The competing perspectives on the motivations for CAFTA are 
also indicative of the diverse opinions in the U.S. legislature over 
 25 José M. Salazar-Xirinachs & Jaime Granados, The US–Central America Free Trade 
Agreement: Opportunities and Challenges, in FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: US STRATEGIES AND 
PRIORITIES 225 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2004). 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. at 229–30. 
 28 Id. (citing Robert Zoellick, US Trade Rep., Globalization, Trade, and Econ. Se-
curity, Remarks at the Nat’l Press Club (Oct. 1, 2000). 
 29 Jeffrey J. Schott, Assessing US FTA Policy, in FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: US 
STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES 361 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., Inst. For Int’l Econ. 2004).  See 
also Salazar-Xirinachs & Grenados, supra note 25, at 234 (“The number of players 
and the accompanying proliferation of sensitivities ensure that the FTAA is an ambi-
tious and complex negotiation, and its precise outcome remains uncertain.”). 
 30 Id. at 230. 
 31 See SCOTT SINCLAIR & KEN TRAYNOR, PUBLIC SERVICES INTERNATIONAL, DIVIDE AND 
CONQUER: THE FTAA, US TRADE STRATEGY, AND PUBLIC SERVICES IN THE AMERICAS, at iii 
(2004), available at http://www.world-psi.org/TemplateEn.cfm?Section=Home& 
Template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=4145. 
 32 Salazar-Xirinachs & Granados, supra note 25, at 230 n.2. 
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whether or not CAFTA was a viable and supportable agreement.33  
Beginning with the narrow passage of the TPA in 2002, which re-
stored so-called “fast-track” negotiating authority for trade agree-
ments to the president,34 the road to negotiating and approving 
agreements such as CAFTA has been dramatically split between sup-
porters and opponents.35  Fast-track negotiations allow “the president 
[to] submit the trade agreement and legislation making the necessary 
changes in domestic law, and Congress [can] vote expeditiously on 
the package without the possibility of amendment.”36  President Bush 
ardently pushed for restoration of fast-track negotiation ability, argu-
ing that “Trade Promotion Authority will give me the flexibility I 
need to secure the greatest possible trade opportunities for America’s 
farmers, workers, families and consumers.”37  However, many mem-
bers of Congress, especially Democrats, were nervous at the prospect 
of restoring such broad trade negotiating powers, giving the “presi-
dent open-ended authority to negotiate trade deals as he sees fit.”38
The divide between Democrats and Republicans in both the 
House of Representatives and the Senate continued to characterize 
the road to the passage of CAFTA.39  It could be argued that the skep-
ticism of the president’s increased trade negotiation authority of the 
TPA carried over into the debate regarding CAFTA, possibly leading 
to stricter scrutiny of the proposal of CAFTA, the first FTA negotiated 
post-TPA.40
In addition to granting fast-track authority, the TPA lays out spe-
cific trade negotiating objectives and designates the groups to be in-
volved in the negotiation of trade agreements and the sequence of 
 33 Joseph Kahn, House Supports Trade Authority Sought by Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 
2001, at A1. 
 34 Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 
Stat. 933 (2002); see also CIS No. PL2002-107-210, Div. B (The TPA “[r]estores and 
modifies Presidential authority to negotiate trade agreements under an expedited 
procedure for Congressional approval.”). 
 35 See Kahn, supra note 33 (reporting that TPA passed approval in the House by a 
narrow vote of 215 to 214). 
 36 DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, FREE TRADE UNDER FIRE 171 (2002). 
 37 Kahn, supra note 33 at A1. 
 38 Id.  (Democrats arguing that TPA “failed to mandate that trade agreements set 
labor and environmental standards as well as tariff and quota levels”). 
 39 See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, Pleas and Promises by G.O.P. as Trade Pact Wins by 2 
Votes, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2005, at A1 (“[T]he House approved the trade pact by the 
paper-thin margin of two votes, 217 to 215.”); Edmund L. Andrews, Senate Approves 
Free Trade Pact, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2005, at A1 (reporting that Senate approved 
CAFTA by a vote of fifty-four to forty-five). 
 40 See infra notes 46–61 and accompanying text. 
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events for proposal of an FTA.41  Other than the president, the major 
actors in the process of trade negotiation prior to submission for 
congressional approval include the United States Trade Representa-
tive (USTR) and the Labor Advisory Committee for Trade Negotia-
tions and Trade Policy (LAC).42  On October 1, 2002 the USTR offi-
cially notified Congress of the intent to pursue an FTA with countries 
of Central America, and on August 4, 2003, the USTR amended its 
notification to integrate the Dominican Republic into the agreement 
as well.43
On February 20, 2004, the President informed Congress of his 
intent to sign the proposed agreement with the Central American 
countries, and on March 24, 2004, he apprised Congress that the 
agreement would include the Dominican Republic.44  Pursuant to the 
provisions of the TPA, the president must inform the LAC of his in-
tent to submit a trade agreement to Congress.45  The LAC then re-
views the proposed agreement and compiles a report adjudging 
whether the objectives of the TPA have been met.46  On March 19, 
2004, the LAC submitted its report regarding the proposed CAFTA 
bill: 
It is the opinion of the LAC that CAFTA neither fully meets the 
negotiating objectives laid out by Congress in TPA, nor promotes 
the economic interest of the United States.  The agreement 
clearly fails to meet some congressional negotiating objectives, 
and it barely complies with others.  The agreement repeats many 
of the same mistakes of the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA), and is likely to lead to the same deteriorating 
trade balances, lost jobs, and workers’ rights violations that 
NAFTA has created.47
 41 19 U.S.C. § 3803 (Supp. IV 2004). 
 42 Id. 
 43 Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement 
Implementation Act, H.R. REP. NO. 109-182, at 8–9 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 337, 344 [hereinafter Ways and Means Report]. 
 44 Id. 
 45 § 3803(c)(3)(A). 
 46 Id. § 3803(c)(3)(A)(i). 
 47 LABOR ADVISORY COMMITEE FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS AND TRADE POLICY, REPORT 
TO THE PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS AND THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE ON 
THE U.S.-CENTRAL AMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 1 (2004), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA_Reports/
asset_upload_file63_5935.pdf [hereinafter LAC REPORT]. 
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Despite the negative opinion from the LAC and its recommendation 
to change the agreement, CAFTA was submitted for congressional 
approval largely unmodified from its original form.48
CAFTA was officially introduced in the House on June 23, 2005, 
and referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means.49  The 
vote of the Committee yielded twenty-five votes in favor of the bill 
and sixteen votes in opposition.  The majority, therefore, recom-
mended the bill for House approval, stating: 
The Committee believes that the Agreement meets the objectives 
and priorities set forth in the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Author-
ity Act of 2002 (TPA).  The Agreement covers all agricultural and 
industrial sectors, opens DR-CAFTA markets to U.S. services, con-
tains robust protections for U.S. investors and intellectual prop-
erty rights holders, and includes strong labor and environment 
provisions.  In addition to the new commercial opportunities, DR-
CAFTA will help cement many of the recent democratic, legal, 
and economic reforms in the DR-CAFTA countries.50
The minority of the House Committee on Ways and Means expressed 
their dissenting view by referring to the Administration’s proposed 
bill as a “missed opportunity . . . to negotiate and submit to Congress 
for approval an agreement that would have ensured that the benefits 
of trade flow broadly to working people, small farmers and society at 
large, as well as to larger businesses.”51  The distinctly different con-
clusions of the LAC, the minority of the House Committee on Ways 
and Means, and the majority of the Committee, in determining 
whether CAFTA, as proposed, was in compliance with the objectives 
of United States trade policy would prove to be a contentious issue on 
the House floor as well.52
The House, as well as the Senate, was largely split regarding the 
desirability of implementing CAFTA, especially concerning labor 
provisions53 and the withdrawal of countries that were parties to 
CAFTA from CBERA.54  The multitude of opposing and supporting 
 48 See Ways and Means Report, supra note 43, at 1. 
 49 151 CONG. REC. H5100 (daily ed. June 23, 2005). 
 50 Ways and Means Report, supra note 43, at 2. 
 51 Id. 
 52 See Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement 
Implementation Act, 151 CONG. REC. H6884 (daily ed. July 27, 2005) (statements of 
Rep. Thomas et al.). 
 53 Id. 
 54 CBERA was amended to provide that upon passage of CAFTA, any country that 
is a party to CAFTA would be withdrawn automatically from CBERA and subject 
strictly to the provisions of CAFTA. (“The term ‘former beneficiary country’ means a 
country that ceases to be designated as a beneficiary country under this title because 
SPEECE_FINAL_V2 10/12/2007  2:11:51 PM 
1110 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1101 
 
sentiments of CAFTA culminated on July 27, 2005, with a volatile 
floor debate between strong Democratic and Republican representa-
tives, echoing the divergent views of the House Committee on Ways 
and Means.55  Representative Cardin from Maryland was opposed to 
CAFTA, principally with regard to its labor provisions, stating: 
This will be the first agreement that I will vote against. 
     This is the first agreement in which we actually move back-
wards on advancing international labor standards.  Currently, with 
the Central American countries, we had the Caribbean Basin Ini-
tiative. . . . They get preference.  But in order to get that prefer-
ence, they must move towards international labor standards. . . . 
     We use the threat of withholding trade benefits if they do not 
adopt international labor standards . . . and it is working. . . . 
CAFTA repeals those obligations. . . . [W]hat is in place is enforc-
ing your own rules without any adequate enforcement.56
Representative Cardin’s argument, however, was strongly rebutted by 
a host of CAFTA supporters, including Representative Moran from 
Virginia, positing that without CAFTA the conditions of Central 
America would continue to deteriorate: 
[F]rom the standpoint of policy, certainly this could and should 
have been a much better agreement.  We should have addressed 
labor conditions in a more robust way. . . . But on the whole this 
agreement does much more for Central America than we will 
have the opportunity to do in a long time to come, and that is the 
reality.57
Representative Davis of Alabama responded that without CAFTA the 
United States would not be assisting the countries of Central Amer-
ica, positing: 
[I]nstead of taking these nations that struggle so much day in and 
day out, instead of challenging them to move to a better place, we 
gave up and we accepted the status quo.  And one of the cruelest 
and strangest arguments . . . is that somehow we are not standing 
by these countries if we defeat this agreement.58
Compelling arguments from both sides emerged in the debate over 
the passage of CAFTA, and at the end of the debates CAFTA passed 
the country has become a party to a free trade agreement with the United States.”).  
19 U.S.C.A. § 2702(a)(1)(F) (West 2005). 
 55 See 151 CONG. REC. H6884 (daily ed. July 27, 2005) (statements of Rep. Thomas 
et al.). 
 56 Id. at H6897 (statement of Rep. Cardin). 
 57 Id. (statement of Rep. Moran). 
 58 Id. at H6908 (statement of Rep. Davis). 
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in the House by the narrowest of margins: 217 to 215, with two ab-
staining.59
Rapidly thereafter, the bill officially passed in the Senate by a 
vote of fifty-four to forty-five and was presented to the President on 
July 28, 2005.60  The President signed the bill on August 2, 2005, 
bringing CAFTA into force under Public Law 109-53.61  CAFTA is now 
officially codified under Title 19, chapter 26 of the United States 
Code, section 4001.62
II CAFTA LABOR PROVISIONS AND CONCERNS 
The contentious debate seen in the House, and to a lesser extent 
in the Senate, necessitates a closer examination of the labor provi-
sions of CAFTA that created such strong dissention to the agreement.  
The preamble to CAFTA lists, among other objectives, that the coun-
tries resolve to “[protect], enhance, and enforce basic workers’ rights 
and strengthen their cooperation on labor matters . . . [and build] on 
their respective international commitments on labor.”63  Specifically, 
the labor provisions are contained in chapter 16, which details the 
countries’ statement of shared commitment, provisions for enforce-
ment of labor laws, as well as an annex outlining labor cooperation 
and capacity building.64
The overarching labor requirement of CAFTA is that the coun-
tries “reaffirm their obligations as members of the International La-
bor Organization (ILO) . . . [and] strive to ensure that such labor 
principles . . . are recognized and protected by its law.”65  The ILO 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work are essentially incorpo-
rated into the definition of labor laws in CAFTA; they include: 
(a) the right of association; 
(b) the right to organize and bargain collectively; 
(c) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory 
labor; 
 59 Id. at H6927–28. 
 60 151 CONG. REC. S9253 (daily ed. July 28, 2005). 
 61 Dominican Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement 
Implementation Act, 109 Pub. L. No. 53, 119 Stat. 462 (2005). 
 62 19 U.S.C.A. § 4001 (West 2005). 
 63 Central America-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement, 
Preamble (Aug. 5, 2005), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/ 
Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DR_Final_Texts/Section_Index.html?ht= 
 [hereinafter CAFTA]. 
 64 Id. ch. 16. 
 65 Id. ch. 16.1, para. 1. 
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(d) a minimum age for the employment of children and the pro-
hibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labor; and 
(e) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum 
wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health.66 
CAFTA also recognizes, however, the sovereignty of each country 
party to the agreement and therefore allows for “the right of each 
Party to establish its own domestic labor standards,” but requires that 
“its laws provide for labor standards consistent with the internation-
ally recognized labor rights” established by the ILO.67
The essential criticism regarding the basic minimum labor re-
quirements called for by CAFTA is that, even though Central Ameri-
can countries are parties to the ILO and have signed onto the Decla-
ration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the actual 
practices in the countries fall far below achievement of this stan-
dard.68  Congresswoman Jackson-Lee of Texas opposed CAFTA on 
the basis that “omission of labor standards will result in continuation 
of awful and unconscionable labor conditions for both adults and 
children.”69
The rebuttal to this argument is that there has been great pro-
gress made by the Central American countries to raise their labor 
standards as their democracies emerge and continue to strengthen.70  
Supporters of CAFTA note that each of the Central American coun-
tries has incorporated into their constitutions and civil law systems 
the core ILO standards and contend that they will continue to pro-
gress by being parties to CAFTA.71  The argument about the existence 
or non-existence of effective labor laws, however, inherently calls into 
question the enforceability of such laws. 
CAFTA enforcement provisions require that: 
(a)  A Party shall not fail to effectively enforce its labor laws 
through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, 
 66 Id. ch. 16.8, paras. (a)–(e). 
 67 Id. ch. 16.1, para. 2. 
 68 See LAC REPORT, supra note 47, at 3 (“Under CAFTA, governments in Central 
America will be free to maintain their labor laws far below ILO standards.”). 
 69 151 CONG. REC. H6884, H6912 (daily ed. July 27, 2005) (statement of Rep. Jack-
son-Lee). 
 70 See Allgeier, supra note 24 (“Administration’s own, more detailed analysis of 
the labor rights situation . . . confirms that their labor laws are generally ILO-
consistent.”). 
 71 See INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, INT’L LABOUR ORG., FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND 
RIGHTS AT WORK:  A LABOUR LAW STUDY: COSTA RICA, EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, 
HONDURAS, AND NICARAGUA (2003), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/ 
dialogue/download/cafta.pdf. 
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in a manner affecting trade between the Parties, after the 
date of entry into force of this Agreement. 
(b) Each Party retains the right to exercise discretion with respect 
to investigatory, prosecutorial, regulatory, and compliance 
matters and to make decisions, regarding the allocation of re-
sources to enforcement with respect to other labor matters 
determined to have higher priorities.  Accordingly, the Par-
ties understand that a Party is in compliance with subpara-
graph (a) where a course of action or inaction reflects a rea-
sonable exercise of such discretion, or results from a bona fide 
decision regarding the allocation of resources.72 
CAFTA’s enforcement measures require only that countries enforce 
their own labor standards, not that they create or upgrade any laws.73  
The opponents of CAFTA worry that requiring only the enforcement 
of current laws amounts to an endorsement of the current sub-
standard labor conditions in Central American countries.74  The dis-
senting opinion from the House Committee on Ways and Means 
criticized the CAFTA enforcement requirements by stating, “even the 
best enforcement of inadequate laws can never yield acceptable  
results.”75
Additionally, CAFTA outlines the available recourse should a 
country fail to enforce its existing laws.76  The first step in dispute 
resolution for labor violations begins with government-to-government 
consultations, progressing then to discussion between labor ministers 
of the respective countries.77  If the labor ministers cannot agree on a 
course of action, the matter is referred to an arbitral panel.78  CAFTA 
provides for the establishment of a roster of individuals to serve as 
panelists in matters of labor dispute.79  Labor roster members are to 
be chosen on an objective basis,80 not to be affiliated with any party,81 
 72 CAFTA, supra note 63, ch. 16.2, paras. 1(a)–(b). 
 73 See id. ch. 16.1, para. 2 (“[r]ecognizing the right of each Party to establish its 
own domestic labor standards”). 
 74 See Ways and Means Report, supra note 43, at 47–50 (arguing that “[r]equiring 
only that countries ‘enforce their own laws’ with regard to labor standards is equally 
inappropriate”). 
 75 Id. at 50. 
 76 See CAFTA, supra note 63, ch. 20. 
 77 OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, CAFTA FACTS: DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT: EQUIVALENT PROCEDURES & REMEDIES FOR COMMERCIAL AND LABOR 
DISPUTES 1 (2005), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/ 
CAFTA/Briefing_Book/asset_upload_file812_7869.pdf. 
 78 Id. 
 79 CAFTA, supra note 63, ch. 16, art. 16.7, para. 1. 
 80 Id. para. 2(b). 
 81 Id. para. 2(c). 
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and to “have expertise or experience in labor law or its enforcement, 
international trade, or the resolution of disputes arising under inter-
national agreements.”82
The panel then conducts a review of the alleged labor viola-
tion.83  If the panel finds that a country is not in compliance with the 
labor standards, the parties themselves have a chance to determine 
the appropriate resolution.84  If no resolution is to be had, then a 
monetary penalty of up to fifteen million dollars annually may be im-
posed until the violating country comes into compliance.85  The fine 
paid will be deposited in a fund whereby the monies shall be used for 
appropriate labor initiatives in the country of the violating party.86  If 
the party in violation fails to pay the fine, the complaining party may 
take steps to collect the monies due, including temporary suspension 
of tariff benefits equivalent to the value of the fine.87  However, the 
decision to suspend trade benefits should only be made bearing in 
mind the “objective of eliminating barriers to trade and while seeking 
to avoid unduly affecting parties or interests not party to the dis-
pute.”88
The labor violation remedies under CAFTA are markedly differ-
ent from the unilateral sanction provisions in its predecessor, 
CBERA.89  Unilateral trade preference programs, such as CBERA, 
provide stricter standards of enforcement than those found in 
CAFTA because they allow for “the withdrawal of trade benefits if 
steps are not taken to meet international labor standards.” 90  Oppo-
nents to CAFTA cite the success of the sanction imposition measures 
contained in CBERA, noting that “most of the labor law reforms of 
the past twenty years in the CAFTA countries has been due to the lev-
erage of workers rights conditionality under [CBERA].”91  As previ-
ously mentioned, however, supporters of CAFTA view CBERA as an 
unequal trade preference program because the United States does 
not receive reciprocal reduced tariff exports to Central American 
countries.92
 82 Id. para. 2(a). 
 83 CAFTA, supra note 63, ch. 20, art. 20.13, paras. 3(a)–(c). 
 84 Id. art. 20.15, para. 3. 
 85 Id. art. 20.17, para. 2. 
 86 Id. para. 4. 
 87 Id. para. 5. 
 88 Id. 
 89 See 19 U.S.C. § 2703(e)(1)(A)–(B) (2000); see also supra note 22. 
 90 LAC Report, supra note 47 at 10. 
 91 Ways and Means Report, supra note 43, at 49. 
 92 Allgeier, supra note 24. 
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Critics of CAFTA take issue with its enforcement provisions, ar-
guing that (1) the maximum fine for a labor violation is capped ex-
ceedingly low at fifteen million dollars and (2) any fine paid is actu-
ally returned to the violating country, in essence paying themselves 
for their own violations, with little supervision for fund appropria-
tion.93  Supporters of CAFTA counter that a fifteen million dollar fine 
is a significant amount to the developing countries of Central Amer-
ica and that the threat of having to pay this fine until the situation is 
rectified is a powerful incentive to uphold the obligation of enforcing 
their domestic labor laws.94
Additionally, supporters of CAFTA point to the unique “Capacity 
Building” provisions embodied in Article 16 to reinforce their posi-
tion that CAFTA actually does more for workers’ rights than other 
FTAs.95  CAFTA recognizes that “cooperation on labor issues can play 
an important role in advancing development in the territory of the 
Parties and in providing opportunities to improve labor standards.”96  
Annex 16.5 provides for the creation of a Labor Cooperation and 
Capacity Building Mechanism (CBM), composed of contact points 
from each country.97  The purpose of the CBM is to “initiate bilateral 
or regional cooperative activities on labor issues,”98 addressing issues 
such as the effective application of the ILO fundamental rights,99 out-
lining inspection systems to improve labor enforcement,100 and ap-
propriate methods for supervising compliance of working condi-
tions.101  The annex additionally suggests certain means for the 
implementation of cooperative activities, although the parties may 
agree to use whatever means they deem appropriate,102 as long as the 
means “operate in a manner that respects each Party’s law and sover-
eignty.”103  Opponents to CAFTA acknowledge that while these provi-
sions are “crafted to encourage enforcement of labor rights, [they] 
fall short of the strength needed to reverse years of indifference and 
 93 LAC Report, supra note 47, at 12 (“[L]abor enforcement procedures cap the 
maximum amount of fines and sanctions available at an unacceptably low level, and 
allow violators to pay fines to themselves with little oversight.”). 
 94 See Ways and Means Report, supra note 43, at 42. 
 95 Id. at 43. 
 96 CAFTA, supra note 63, ch. 16, art. 16.5, para. 1. 
 97 Id. Annex 16.5, para. 1. 
 98 Id. para. 3. 
 99 Id. para. 3(a). 
 100 Id. para. 3(d). 
 101 Id. para. 3(g). 
 102 CAFTA, supra note 63, ch. 16, annex 16.5, para. 4. 
 103 Id. para. 1. 
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systematic neglect.”104  This neglect is embodied in “bureaucratic im-
pediments, ineffective legal systems and insufficient resources”105 such 
that the CBM’s potential for success is reduced because the benefit of 
CAFTA is given before workers rights are firmly rooted in Central 
American countries.106
III.     THE FUTURE FOR FTAS 
The construction and content of CAFTA differ from its prede-
cessor FTAs, evidencing an acknowledgement that the past models 
were not successful in securing adherence to labor standards.  These 
changes, although progressive, constitute a mere starting place for 
the structuring of future FTAs.  This foundation, coupled with fur-
ther restructuring, will ensure that labor rights espoused in prospec-
tive agreements are given a stronger chance of effectuation.  This fi-
nal section of the Comment will briefly survey the character of FTA 
evolution, outline CAFTA similarities and differences to these agree-
ments, and suggest a model on which future FTAs should be based. 
A. Evolution of FTAs 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was the 
first U.S. FTA to recognize the inherent connection between trade 
and labor, outlining certain provisions in the North American 
Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC).107  The NAALC is a side 
agreement to NAFTA that details the labor requirements of the 
agreement, although not in the main agreement itself.108  The 
NAALC set the stage for future FTAs’ recognition of labor provisions; 
however, it is unique in that the evolution of FTAs progressed away 
from side agreements that outlined the labor provisions (such as the 
NAALC) to an actual incorporation of the labor standards into the 
main body of the agreements.109
Although NAFTA initiated the awareness of labor rights, the 
substantive provisions of the NAALC are distinct from the provisions 
 104 151 CONG. REC. H6884, H6919 (daily ed. July 27, 2005) (statement of Rep. Van 
Hollen). 
 105 Id. 
 106 See id. 
 107 See HEPPLE, supra note 1, at 107. 
 108 Id. 
 109 See id. (NAFTA and the NAALC “have been the model, with some significant 
variations, for later [FTAs] negotiated by the US with Jordan (2000), Chile and Sin-
gapore (2003) , . . . Australia (2004), and . . . [CAFTA].”); see also id. at 116. 
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of future FTAs, including CAFTA.110  The NAALC’s main focus was 
on the “enforcement of domestic labour law by each of the parties, and 
not the application of international labour standards.”111  The main 
obligations of parties to the NAALC include the establishment and 
maintenance of high labor standards, the promotion of compliance 
and public awareness, and the effective enforcement of domestic la-
bor laws.112  Although these obligations appear stringent, the purpose 
behind NAFTA/NAALC did not facilitate strict adherence,113 as there 
are certain glosses throughout the NAALC that temper adherence to 
the obligations.  For example, Article 49(1) provides that a state has 
not failed to effectively enforce its labor laws if the state makes a 
“bona fide decision[] to allocate resources to . . . other labour mat-
ters determined to have higher priorities.”114
The evolution of FTAs has built upon the foundational elements 
established by the NAALC principles and heightened the labor provi-
sions prescribed.115  One of the most significant changes is the incor-
poration of labor standards directly into the main body of the agree-
ment: 
The US-Jordan FTA . . . is the first to contain labour rights and 
environmental obligations in the text of the main agreement in-
stead of a side agreement.  The significance of this is that disputes 
over labour rights are subject to the same dispute settlement pro-
cedures and remedies as the rest of the agreement.116
The U.S.-Jordan FTA set the stage for incorporating labor provisions 
directly into the agreement as reflected in the subsequent U.S.-Chile, 
U.S.-Singapore, and U.S.-Australia FTAs, as well as in CAFTA.117
 110 See id. at 108. 
 111 Id. 
 112 See HEPPLE, supra note 1, at 112–13. 
 113 Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Ben Goodrich, Lessons from NAFTA, in FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS: US STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES 37, 45–46 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2004) 
(“The labor side agreement is little more than a toothless list of hopes and aspira-
tions.”). 
 114 HEPPLE, supra note 1, at 113–14. 
 115 See Marianne Hogan, Note, DR-CAFTA Prescribes a Poison Pill: Remedying the In-
adequacies of Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement Labor Provisions, 
39 SUFFOLK U. L. Rev. 511, 523–27, 532–34 (2006).  For examples of FTAs that have 
built upon the NAALC structure, see Agreement on Trade in Textiles and Textile 
Products, U.S.-Cambodia, Jan. 20, 1999, Hein’s No. KAV 5781[hereinafter CBTA]; 
U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 5; U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 5; U.S.-Singapore Free 
Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., May 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026. 
 116 HEPPLE, supra note 1, at 116. 
 117 Id. at 117. 
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Furthermore, the U.S.-Jordan agreement slightly, though quite 
significantly, expanded the scope of labor provisions by not only pre-
scribing enforcement of domestic labor laws (as called for in 
NAFTA/NAALC), but also by expressly linking domestic labor law 
standards to international standards called for by the ILO.118  The 
U.S.-Jordan FTA calls for the “parties . . . to strive to ensure that such 
[domestic] labour principles and the internationally recognised la-
bour rights set out in Article 6(6) of the agreement are ‘recognised 
and protected by domestic labour law.’”119  This provision may help to 
strengthen the focus on international labor standards and a uniform-
ity among labor standards between the parties to the agreement; 
however, because the language of “striving to ensure” recognition is 
merely aspirational, it has been suggested that “the mortar ‘may be 
too thin and watery to do the job’ of closing the gaps in NAALC.”120
One of the most distinct features of the U.S.-Jordan FTA is the 
compliance measures available should a party derogate from the la-
bor provisions established by the agreement.121  The U.S.-Jordan FTA 
first calls for all disputes to be referred to a Joint Committee and then 
subsequently a dispute settlement panel.122  If no resolution by either 
the Joint Committee or the dispute settlement panel is to be had, 
“the affected Party shall be entitled to take any appropriate and com-
mensurate measure.”123  This provision gives wide latitude to the injured 
party to respond with open-ended sanctions, benefit withdrawal, or 
any other “appropriate” measure for an indefinite period of time and 
with no dollar amount limitation.124  As shall be seen, the FTAs that 
followed the U.S.-Jordan agreement regressed from this broad stan-
dard and more narrowly tailored the availability and magnitude of 
penalties on parties who violate labor standards.125
B. The CAFTA Phase 
CAFTA has followed suit with the FTAs that were established af-
ter the U.S.-Jordan agreement.  CAFTA provisions have progressed 
from original NAALC standards by first incorporating the labor re-
 118 Id. at 116. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. at 117 (citing Marley S. Weiss, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back—or Vice Versa: 
Labor Rights Under Free Trade Agreements from NAFTA, Through Jordan, via Chile, to Latin 
America, and Beyond, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 689, 718 (2003)). 
 121 See HEPPLE, supra note 1, at 118. 
 122 U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 5, art. 17, para. 1. 
 123 Id. art. 17, para. 2(b) (emphasis added). 
 124 See HEPPLE, supra note 1, at 117. 
 125 See infra Part IV.B. 
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quirements directly into the main agreement, following suit of the 
U.S.-Jordan FTA and its progeny.126  Furthermore, although the con-
struction of CAFTA has retained the NAALC’s promotion of state 
sovereignty over labor laws, CAFTA, like the U.S.-Jordan FTA, has 
also incorporated international labor standards into the agreement 
by recognition of ILO Principles.127  This is especially significant as 
the “[eleven] labour principles in NAALC are similar to but not the 
same as those in ILO conventions.  They are less specific and some-
times lower than ILO obligations.”128  As noted above, however, the 
actual effectiveness of this recognition is limited by the aspirational 
language of “striving to ensure,”129 as well as by the retention of an es-
cape clause that provides an out even if a party does violate the stan-
dards called for in the agreement.130
Although CAFTA in many ways mirrors the U.S.-Jordan FTA, it 
does depart from this model in a very significant way.  Agreements 
subsequent to the U.S.-Jordan FTA, including CAFTA, relaxed the 
permissible party responses to the derogation of labor rights.131  
CAFTA greatly restricts the availability and magnitude of penalties 
available should a party violate the labor provisions.132  CAFTA calls 
for enforcement measures to be taken when a party “fail[s] to effec-
tively enforce its labor laws . . . in a manner affecting trade.”133  
Whereas the U.S.-Jordan agreement does not have a ceiling for the 
amount of fine imposed,134 under CAFTA the imposition of fines on 
the offending party is capped at fifteen million dollars per year, ad-
justed for inflation.135 Additionally, where the U.S.-Jordan FTA does 
not limit the time, duration, or magnitude of benefit withdrawal,136 
CAFTA prescribes that benefits may only be suspended for failure to 
 126 See CAFTA, supra note 63, ch. 16 
 127 Id. art. 16.1 para. 2. 
 128 HEPPLE, supra note 1, at 114. 
 129 See supra note 120. 
 130 HEPPLE, supra note 1, at 114.  This escape clause states that a party does not vio-
late domestic or international labor standards if it can show that the derogation of 
labor rights was a result of a bona fide decision regarding the allocation of resources 
or a reasonable exercise of discretion over matters determined to have higher priori-
ties.  CAFTA, supra note 63, ch. 16, art. 16.2, para. 1(b). 
 131 See HEPPLE, supra note 1, at 114. 
 132 See CAFTA, supra note 63, ch. 20. 
 133 CAFTA, supra note 63, ch. 16, art. 16.2, para. 1(a). 
 134 U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 5, art. 17 (noting the absence of any monetary 
limit on enforcement measures). 
 135 CAFTA, supra note 63, ch. 20, art. 20.17, para. 2. 
 136 U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 5, art. 17, para. 2(b) (The US-Jordan FTA only 
calls for a reasonableness standard where “the affected Party shall be entitled to take 
any appropriate and commensurate measures.”). 
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comply with the payment of fines and the monetary value of benefits 
suspended may not exceed the value of the outstanding fine.137
CAFTA is also distinct from the U.S.-Jordan FTA in that it calls 
for a CBM, annexed to the labor provisions.138  The CBM outlines the 
principal functions, capacity building priorities and implementation 
of cooperative activities between the parties with regard to labor co-
operation.139  The CBM further integrates international standards for 
labor by advocating that the parties seek support from the ILO,140 
undertake cooperative labor activities regarding the ILO’s fundamen-
tal principles,141 and work cooperatively on labor issues.142
C. Recipe for Success in FTAs 
Although CAFTA has progressed substantially from its predeces-
sor NAFTA/NAALC, as well as the more contemporary agreements 
such as the U.S.-Jordan FTA, CAFTA should not be used as an exact 
model for future FTAs.  As Howard Rosen notes, “FTAs become obso-
lete as soon as they are signed.  Most agreements look to the past and 
do not anticipate the future,”143 and it is therefore important to have 
a strong agreement at the outset.  As FTAs inevitably proliferate, 
measures are needed to effectively shape future agreements.  Key 
components to the structuring of future FTAs include agreements 
conditioned on greater institutional upgrading prior to concluding 
an FTA, deeper integration of internationally recognized labor rights 
and human rights into the agreements, and a wider latitude of en-
forcement measures in the agreements themselves.  In developing a 
successful model for efficient and effective labor rights, recourse to 
the provisions of other FTAs, both domestic and international, pro-
vides helpful insight to the structuring of the ideal FTA. 
The countries party to the agreement need to have sufficient in-
stitutional capacity to take full advantage of being a member to an 
FTA.144  This necessarily requires that parties make the requisite in-
vestment into institutions linked to labor to insure the compliance 
 137 See CAFTA, supra note 63, ch. 20, art. 20.17, para. 5. 
 138 CAFTA, supra note 63, ch. 16, Annex 16.5. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. para. 2(d). 
 141 Id. para. 3. 
 142 Id. para. 4. 
 143 Howard Rosen, Free Trade Agreements as Foreign Policy Tools: The US-Israel and US-
Jordan FTAs, in FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS:  US STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES 51, 75 (Jeffrey 
J. Schott, ed., 2004). 
 144 See Salazar-Xirinachs & Granados, supra note 25, at 262. 
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with the provisions laid out in an FTA.145  Such investment includes 
improving “the rule of law, the judicial system, and corporate govern-
ance and social responsibility.”146  One way to accomplish this institu-
tional upgrading is by integrating provisions into the FTA that reward 
countries with increasing preferential trade treatment for their de-
monstrable improvements in labor and working conditions. 
The Cambodia Bilateral Textile Agreement (CBTA) is an exam-
ple of a domestic trade agreement that incorporates such condi-
tions.147  The labor standards set forth in the CBTA provide that: 
The Parties seek to create new employment opportunities and 
improve living standards and working conditions through an en-
hanced trading relationship; affirm respect for each Party’s legal 
system and seeking to ensure that labor laws and regulations pro-
vide for high quality and productive workplaces; and seek to fos-
ter transparency in the administration of labor law, promote 
compliance with, and effective enforcement of, existing labor law, 
and promote the general labor rights embodied in the Cambo-
dian labor code.148
To this end, the Cambodian government shall undertake to “support 
the implementation of a program to improve working conditions in 
the textile and apparel sector, including internationally recognized 
core labor standards.”149  The agreement further calls for semi-annual 
consultations between the governments to determine the progress of 
program implementation.150  “If the United States makes a positive 
determination” that “working conditions . . . substantially comply with 
such labor law and standards . . . , then the Specific Limits [on Cam-
bodian annual exports] shall be increased by 14 percent for the 
Agreement Year . . . .”151  This increase will only be sustained or in-
creased in following years upon subsequent positive determina-
tions.152  If Cambodia fails “to take major action resulting in a signifi-
 145 Id. at 262–63 (“Improving compliance with international labor . . . standards 
first and foremost needs substantive investments in institutional capacities and in a 
variety of specific projects.”). 
 146 Id. at 263 (Improvement in institutional capacity building is required for coun-
tries to “attract sufficient investment to grow and take full advantage of the new mar-
ket access opened up by [an FTA].”). 
 147 CBTA, supra note 115. 
 148 Id. art. 10, para. A. 
 149 Id. para. B. 
 150 Id. para. D. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. art. 10, para. D. 
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cant change in working conditions, then the . . . United States may 
withdraw such an increase.”153
Another essential step to strengthening the labor provisions of 
FTAs is not only the recognition of international labor standards, but 
also the inclusion of human rights protection in general.  In this re-
gard the external trade agreements of the European Union (EU) 
provide a helpful model for the incorporation of human rights into 
FTAs.  Most notably, the Cotonou Agreement, signed in June 2000 in 
Cotonou, Benin, is a partnership agreement between the African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (ACP) and the EU, including, 
among other objectives, trade preferences between the blocks of 
states.154  The preamble to the Cotonou Agreement details the par-
ties’ willingness to implement a “comprehensive and integrated ap-
proach for a strengthened partnership . . . [including] trade rela-
tions.”155  As part of this “integrated approach,” the preamble 
incorporates reference to various human rights documents, including 
the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, among others.156  Article Nine further delineates the essential 
elements of the agreement which include “[r]espect for all human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, including respect for fundamental 
social rights, democracy based on the rule of law and transparent and 
accountable governance [as] an integral part of sustainable develop-
ment.”157  In addition to the human rights clauses, the agreement also 
contains provisions for recognition of ILO standards.158
 153 CBTA, supra note 115, art. 10, para. D.  The success of these provisions is dem-
onstrated by the proactive involvement and desire of the United States and Cambo-
dia to effectuate the agreement.  After the passage of CBTA, the United States and 
Cambodia jointly requested the ILO’s assistance in monitoring the Cambodian tex-
tile and apparel sector.  HEPPLE, supra note 1, at 116.  The ILO project undertook to 
observe and aid the institutional capacity of the Cambodian government to improve 
working conditions in these sectors.  Id.  The ILO endeavor was characterized by a 
tripartite Project Advisory Committee, which required that in order for businesses to 
be eligible for the heightened export quotas, they had to register their factories with 
the Committee.  Id. at 121.  In addition, these registered factories must allow the ILO 
inspectors access to monitor their facilities and interact with the workers.  Id.  To 
date, the ILO has discovered evidence of incorrect wage payment, involuntary over-
time, and anti-union discrimination.  Id.  Although the ILO inspectors lack enforce-
ment capabilities, “their work has resulted in improvements in a number of facto-
ries.”  Id. at 121–22. 
 154 Partnership Agreement Between the Members of the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific Group and the European Community and its Member States, 2000 O.J. 
L317/3, art. 36, para. 1 [hereinafter Cotonou Agreement]. 
 155 Id. Preamble. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. art. 9, para. 1. 
 158 Id. art. 50. 
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The significance of this two-pronged incorporation and refer-
ence to human rights is that “a grave breach of human rights or de-
mocratic principles by one party would entitle the other to terminate 
the [agreement] or to suspend its operation in whole or in part.”159  
The Cotonou Agreement also calls for a sixty-day consultation period 
and that any measures taken must be “in accordance with interna-
tional law, and proportional to the violation,” with suspension as a 
last resort.160  This higher level of adherence, not only to labor, but 
also to human rights standards, has given the parties to the Cotonou 
Agreement more latitude when violations of the rights of citizens oc-
cur.161
Enforceability of the designated international standards is also a 
key issue in structuring an FTA’s labor standards.  Although most 
FTAs acknowledge an international standard for labor rights, these 
provisions have “often been [seen] as aspirational standards to be 
achieved rather than actual commitments to be enforced.”162  In this 
vein, stringent enforcement measures are needed to better effectuate 
the labor provisions of an agreement, rendering them more than 
mere recitations. 
The pinnacle of enforceability is “fully enforceable labor obliga-
tions that enjoy the same status as commercial and other obligations 
of the relevant trade agreement.”163  As an example, NAFTA/NAALC 
provide only that certain labor standards outlined are subject to pen-
alties, instead of across-the-board enforceability of all provisions.164  
This undermines the strength of the labor provisions by making the 
commitment “to protect . . . rights merely hortatory.”165  Therefore, 
the strongest agreements are those that provide non-discriminatory 
enforcement, with a wide choice of enforcement mechanisms. 
 159 HEPPLE, supra note 1, at 122 (citation omitted). 
 160 Cotonou Agreement, supra note 154, art. 96, paras. 2(a)–(c). 
 161 See HEPPLE, supra note 1, at 123 (“Suspension . . . was used against Zimbabwe, 
together with other restrictions, because of the continued serious violations of hu-
man rights and of the freedom of opinion, of association and of peaceful assembly . . 
. .”). 
 162 Sandra Polaski, Protecting Labor Rights through Trade Agreements: An Analytical 
Guide, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 13, 17 (2003). 
 163 Id. at 19. 
 164 Id. at 18 (The NAALC only provides “the possibility of dispute settlement and 
fines for failure to protect three of eleven labor rights covered . . . . [L]aws on child 
labor, minimum wage, and health and safety can be enforced . . . . However, freedom 
of association, non-discrimination, forced labor, rights of migrant workers, and other 
rights cannot be similarly enforced.”). 
 165 Id. 
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As previously mentioned, the U.S.-Jordan FTA provides the wid-
est latitude of enforcement measures should a country not comply 
with the labor standards articulated.166  Agreements “such as the U.S-
Jordan FTA[] create a right for a country that is party to the agree-
ment to challenge an alleged failure by another party to protect its 
citizens’ labor rights.”167  Possible enforcement measures include 
withdrawal of trade benefits granted under the FTA or any other 
“appropriate and commensurate measure,” including sanctions.168  
The U.S.-Jordan FTA does not limit enforceability to penalties, but 
provides for more tailored enforcement to the particular violation by 
allowing for any measure of enforcement that is “appropriate.”169  By 
establishing the availability of different options of enforcement, the 
punishment imposed can be structured so as to achieve the principal 
goals of penalties.  These goals include a penalty that adequately de-
ters a party from a violation, proportionality between the infraction 
and the penalty, and a penalty that helps to ameliorate the viola-
tion.170
CAFTA, and future FTAs, should undertake to incorporate the 
aforementioned provisions into the agreements to make FTAs and 
the labor provisions contained therein a recipe for success.  The ideal 
FTA would begin with the fundamental structure of CAFTA, such as 
incorporating the labor provisions directly into the main body of the 
agreement171 and articulating an international minimum standard of 
workers’ rights by recognition of ILO principles.172  The most mean-
ingful FTA, however, would also call for adherence not only to ILO 
principles, but also to universally accepted human rights, as best 
demonstrated in the Cotonou Agreement.173  This incorporation 
would raise the bar for countries participating in FTAs and act as a 
double incentive for the minimum standard of workers rights by re-
quiring observance to human rights in general. 
 166 See U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 5.  See also supra notes 131–37 and accompany-
ing text. 
 167 Polaski, supra note 162, at 18. 
 168 U.S.-Jordan FTA, supra note 5, art. 17, para. 2(b). 
 169 See HEPPLE, supra note 1, at 117 (referring to the “open-ended” nature of en-
forcement measures in the US-Jordan FTA). 
 170 See Polaski, supra note 162, at 20 (suggesting standard objectives of penalties 
and considerations in determining an appropriate penalty when labor provisions are 
violated). 
 171 See supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text. 
 172 See supra notes 127–30 and accompanying text. 
 173 See supra notes 154–60 and accompanying text. 
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 The ideal FTA would also advance a CAFTA-like capacity build-
ing mechanism to help solidify governmental infrastructure for the 
attainment of secure working conditions.  The model, however, 
would go beyond mere capacity-building to establish reward-based 
provisions, like those found in the CBTA.174  These provisions would 
provide further tangible incentives for countries to improve workers’ 
rights and fundamental labor principles by offering increased eco-
nomic preferences for demonstrable improvements in these areas. 
The final ingredient for success in FTAs is a reversion to wider 
enforcement capabilities as found in the U.S.-Jordan FTA.175  CAFTA 
and other agreements have taken a step backwards from the “appro-
priate and commensurate” measures available in the U.S.-Jordan 
agreement176 to a more “one size fits all” approach that limits en-
forceability to fines capped at fifteen million dollars.177  This en-
forcement provision should not be eradicated in new FTAs, but 
rather expanded upon, so that penalties may be imposed on a case-
by-case basis in order to best achieve the objectives of deterrence, 
proportionality, and amelioration. 
Through an incorporation of the above mentioned provisions 
into new FTAs, the labor provisions of such agreements are given a 
substantial chance of accomplishing the goal of a meaningful inter-
national standard for labor rights.   
CONCLUSION 
As evidenced by the passage of CAFTA, the global community is 
becoming more intertwined as the barriers to trade are reduced and 
products and resources flow across borders.178  In the continual 
march toward free trade, the issue of the domestic labor conditions 
of trading partners becomes a key element in the structuring of an 
agreement.179  In order to reap the full gamut of benefits derived 
from free trade, a strong and enforceable standard for labor rights 
needs to be incorporated as one of the pinnacle objectives of an 
FTA.180  Although CAFTA includes many of the foundational ele-
ments to accomplishing this goal, the future wave of FTAs should in-
clude more incentive to improve working conditions, higher stan-
 174 See supra notes 147–53 and accompanying text. 
 175 See supra notes 121–25 and accompanying text. 
 176 Id. 
 177 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 178 See supra Part I. 
 179 See supra Part II. 
 180 See supra Part IV.C. 
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dards for citizens, and greater flexibility in enforcing the labor stan-
dards.181  Hopefully, through this incorporation, a recipe for success 
may be developed to ensure that all participants in free trade are also 
all recipients of its benefits. 
 
 181 See supra Part IV.B. 
